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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks are now in widespread
use to monitor regions, detect events and acquire information.
To reduce the amount of sending data, an aggregation approach
can be applied along the path from sensors to the sink.
However, usually the carried information contains confidential
data. Therefore, an end-to-end secure aggregation approach
is required to ensure a healthy data reception. End-to-end
encryption schemes that support operations over cypher-text
have been proved important for private party sensor network
implementations. Unfortunately, nowadays these methods are
very complex and not suitable for sensor nodes having limited
resources. In this paper, we propose a secure end-to-end
encrypted-data aggregation scheme. It is based on elliptic curve
cryptography that exploits a smaller key size. Additionally, it
allows the use of higher number of operations on cypher-texts
and prevents the distinction between two identical texts from
their cryptograms. These properties permit to our approach
to achieve higher security levels than existing cryptosystems in
sensor networks. Our experiments show that our proposed se-
cure aggregation method significantly reduces computation and
communication overhead and can be practically implemented
in on-the-shelf sensor platforms. By using homomorphic en-
cryption on elliptic curves, we thus have realized an efficient
and secure data aggregation in sensor networks.
Keywords-Wireless Sensor Networks; Secure Data Agrega-
tion; Homomorphic Encryption; Elliptic Curves.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks have received enormous atten-
tion over past few years, due to a wide range of potential
applications (environmental, ecological, military, etc.). A
typical sensor network is expected to consist of a large
number of sensor nodes deployed randomly in a large
scale. Usually, these nodes have limited power, storage,
communication, and processing capabilities, making energy
consumption an issue.
A major functionality of a sensor node is to measure
environmental values using embedded sensors, and transmit
it to a base station called “sink”. The sensed data needs to
be analyzed, which eventually serves to initiate some action.
Almost this analysis presumes computation of the maximum,
minimum, average, etc. It can be either done at the base
station or by the nodes themselves, in a hierarchical scenario.
In order to reduce the amount of data to be transmitted to
the sink, it is beneficial that this analysis can be done over
the network itself. To save the overall energy resources of
the network, it is agreed that the sensed data needs to be
aggregated on the way to its final destination. Sensor nodes
send their values to certain special nodes, i.e., aggregators.
Each aggregator then condenses the data prior to sending
it on. In terms of bandwidth and energy consumption,
aggregation is beneficial as long as the aggregation process is
not too CPU-intensive. The aggregators can either be special
(more powerful) nodes or regular sensors nodes.
At the same time, sensor networks are often deployed in
public or otherwise untrusted and even hostile environments,
which prompts a number of security issues (e.g., key man-
agement, privacy, access control, authentication, etc.). Then,
if security is a necessary in other (e.g., wired or MANET)
types of networks, it is much more so in sensor networks.
Actually, it is one of the more popular research topic and
many advances have been reported on in recent years.
From the above observations, we can notice the impor-
tance of a cooperative secure data aggregation in sensor
networks. In other terms, after the data gathering and
during transmissions to the base station, each node along
the routing path cooperatively integrates and secures the
fragments messages. In this paper, we focus on security data
aggregation and we propose a simple secure homomorphic
cypher-system that allows efficient aggregation of encrypted
data.
Data encryption becomes necessary in sensor networks
when this type of sensors can be subject of many types
of attacks [1]. Without encryption, adversaries can monitor
and inject false data into the network. In a general manner
the encryption process is done as follows: sensor nodes
must encrypt data on a hop-by-hop basis. An intermediate
node (i.e., aggregator) possessing the keys of all sending
nodes, decrypts the received encrypted value, aggregates all
received values, and encrypts the result for transmission
to the base station. Though viable, this approach is fairly
expensive and complicated, due to the fact of decrypting
each received value before aggregation, which generates
an overhead imposed by key management. Encryption can
solve the security problem, but how can we aggregate over
encrypted data [1]?
Some privacy homomorphism based works have been
proposed recently [2], [3], [4] that, without participating
in checking, the aggregators can directly aggregate the
encrypted data. However, such schemes, for the moment,
need high and complex computations to encrypt data and
aggregate it, which leads to large cypher-texts. Sensor nodes
cannot provide sufficient CPU, memory and bandwidth
to address such complex operations. For instance, Rivest
Shamir Adleman (RSA) cryptosystems [5], [6] are used,
which requires high CPU and memory capabilities to per-
form exponential operations. Therefore, in our study we
adopt an elliptic curve encryption [7] that allows nodes
to generate a smaller key size while providing the same
security level of existing complex schemes. The cypher-
system we exploit permits N additions and one product,
thus it is not limited to a single basic function. A major
advantage of our method is the fact that it has been proved
safe, and until now it has not been cryptanalized. To assess
the practicality of our technique, we evaluate it and compare
it to existing cypher-system. The obtained results show that
we significantly reduce computation and communication
overhead and that our secure aggregation method can be
practically implemented in on-the-shelf sensor platforms.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: in the next
section we present a review of some previous related work.
Section III presents our security model. Sections IV and V
discuss the details of the proposed aggregation scheme for
sensor networks. In Section VI, we describe simulation and
results of simulation experiments. Finally, we end the paper
by conclusions.
II. RELATED WORK
The benefit and vulnerability, as well as the need to secure
in-network aggregation, have been identified by a number of
schemes in the literature. One approach [8] proposed a se-
cure information aggregation protocol to answer queries over
the data acquired by the sensors. Even though their method
provided data authentication to provide secrecy, the data still
sent in plain text format, which removes the privacy during
transmission. Another one [9] proposed a secure energy
efficient data aggregation (ESPDA) to prevent redundant
data transmission in data aggregation. Unlike conventional
techniques, their scheme prevents the redundant transmission
from sensor motes to the aggregator. Before transmitting
sensed data, each sensor transmits a secure pattern to the
aggregator. Only sensors with different data are allowed to
transmit their data to the cluster-head. However, since each
sensor at least needs to transmit a packet containing a pattern
once, power cannot be significantly saved. In addition, each
sensor mote uses a fixed encryption key to encrypt data;
data privacy cannot be maintained in their scheme. In [10],
the authors presented a secure encrypted-data aggregation
scheme for wireless sensor networks. The idea is based
on eliminating redundant sensor readings without using
encryption and maintains data secrecy and privacy during
transmission. This scheme saves energy on sensor nodes but
still do not guarantee the privacy of sent data.
The problem of aggregating encrypted data in sensor net-
works was introduced in [3] and further refined in [2]. The
authors propose to use homomorphic encryption schemes
to enable arithmetic operations over cypher-texts that need
to be transmitted in a multi-hop manner. However, these
approaches provide a higher level of system security, since
nodes would not be equipped with private keys, which
would limit the advantage gained by an attacker compro-
mising some of the nodes. Unfortunately, existing privacy
homomorphisms used for data aggregation in sensor net-
works have exponential bound in computation. It is too
computationally expensive to implement in sensor nodes.
Moreover, the expansion in bit size during the transformation
of plain text to cypher-text introduces costly communication
overhead, which directly translates to a faster depletion of
the sensors energy. On the other hand and from security
viewpoint, the cryptosystems [11] used in these approaches
were cryptanalized [12], which means they can’t guarantee
anymore high security levels.
In this paper we try to relax the statements above by
investigating elliptic curve cryptography that allows feasible
and suitable data aggregation in sensor networks beside the
security of homomorphisms schemes. First, our proposed
scheme for secure data aggregation in sensor networks is
based on a cryptosystem, which has been proved safe and
has not been cryptanalyzed. Another property that enforces
the security level of such approach is coming from the fact
that, as it is the case in ElGamal cryptosystem, for two
identical messages it generates two different cryptograms.
This property suggested fundamental for security in sensor
networks [7], [10], [13], to the best of our knowledge, was
not addressed in previous homomorphism-based security
data aggregation works. Beside all these properties and due
to the use of elliptic curves, our approach saves energy
by allowing nodes to encrypt and aggregate data without
the need of high computations. Lastly, the scheme we use
allows more aggregations types over cypher data than the
homomorphic cryptosystem used until now.
III. SECURITY MODEL
In this work, we are primarily concerned with data privacy
in sensor networks. Our goal is to prevent attackers from
gaining any information about sensor data. Therefore, ensur-
ing an end-to-end privacy between sensor nodes and the sink
becomes problematic. This is largely because popular and
existing cyphers are not additively homomorphic. In other
words, the summation of encrypted data does not allow for
the retrieval of the sum of the plain text values. Moreover,
privacy existing homomorphisms have usually exponential
bound in computation. To overcome this problem, in our
model we propose a security scheme for sensor networks
using elliptic curve based cryptosystem. We show that our
model permits many operations on crypted data and does
not demand high sensor capabilities and computation.
A. Operations over elliptic curves
In this section, we give a brief introduction to elliptic
curve cryptography. The reader is referred to [14] for more
details.
1) Addition and multiplication: Elliptic curve cryptog-
raphy (ECC) is an approach to public-key cryptography
based on the algebraic structure of elliptic curves over finite
fields [14]. Elliptic curves used in cryptography are typically
defined over two types of finite fields: prime fields Fp,
where p is a large prime number, and binary extension fields
F2m [15]. In our paper, we focus on elliptic curves over Fp.
Let p > 3, then an elliptic curve over Fp is defined by a
cubic equation y2 = x3 + ax + b as the set
E =
{
(x, y) ∈ Fp × Fp, y2 ≡ x3 + ax + b (mod p)
}
where a, b ∈ Fp are constants such that 4a3 + 27b2 
0 (mod p). An elliptic curve over Fp consists of the set
of all pairs of affine coordinates (x, y) for x, y ∈ Fp that
satisfy an equation of the above form and an infinity point
O.
The point addition and its special case, point doubling
over E is defined as follows (the arithmetic operations are
defined in Fp) [14] :
Let P = (x1, y1) and Q = (x2, y2) be two points of E.
Then:
P +Q =
{ O if x2 = x1 and y2 = −y1,
(x3, y3) otherwise.
where:
• x3 = λ2 − x1 − x2,
• y3 = λ × (x1 − x3) − y1,
λ =
{
(y2 − y1) × (x2 − x1)−1 if P  Q ,
(3x21 + a) × (2y1)−1 if P = Q.
Finally, we define P + O = O + P = P,∀P ∈ E, which
leads to an abelian group (E,+). On the other hand the
multiplication n × P means P + P + .... + P n times and
−P is the symmetric of P for the group law + defined above
for all P ∈ E.
2) Public/Private keys generation with ECC: In this
section we show how we can generate the public and private
keys for encryption, following the cryptosystem proposed
by Boneh et al. [7]. The analysis of the complexity will be
treated in a later section.
Let τ > 0 be an integer called “security parameter”. To
generate public and private keys, first of all, two τ-bits prime
numbers must be computed. Therefore, a cryptographic
pseudo-random generator can be used to obtain two vectors
of τ bits, q1 and q2. Then, a Miller-Rabin test can be applied
for testing the primality or not of q1 and q2. We denote by
n the product of q1 and q2, n = q1q2, and by l the smallest
positive integer such that p = l× n− 1. l is a prime number
while p = 2 (mod 3).
In order to find the private and public keys, we define
a group H, which presents the points of the super-singular
elliptic curve y2 = x3 + 1 defined over Fp. It consists of
p + 1 = n × l points, and thus has a subgroup of order n,
we call it G. In another step, we compute g and u as two
generators of G and h = q2 × u. Then, following [7], the
public key will be presented by (n,G, g, h) and the private
key by q1.
3) Encryption and Decryption: After the private/public
keys generation, we proceed now to the two encryption and
decryption phases:
• Encryption : Assuming that our messages space con-
sists of integers in the set {0, 1, ...,T}, where T < q2,
and m the (integer) message to encrypt. First, a random
positive integer is picked from the interval [0,n − 1].
Then, the cypher-text is defined by
C = m × g + r × h ∈ G,
in which + and × refer to the additive and multiplica-
tion laws defined previously.
• Decryption : Once the message C arrived to destina-
tion, to decrypt it, we use the private key q1 and the
discrete logarithm of (q1 × C) base q1 × g as follows:
m = logq1×g q1 × C.
This takes expected time
√
T using Pollard’s lambda
method. Moreover, this decryption can be speed-up by
precomputing a table of powers of q1 × g.
B. Homomorphic properties
As we mentioned before, our approach ensures easy
encryption/decryption without any need of extra resources.
This will be proved in the next section. Moreover, our
approach supports homomorphic properties, which gives us
the ability to execute operations on values even though they
have been encrypted. Indeed, it allows N additions and one
multiplication directly on cryptograms, which prevents the
decryption phase at the aggregators level and saves nodes
energy, which is crucial in sensor networks.
Additions over cypher-texts are done as follows: let m1
and m2 be two messages and C1,C2 their cypher-texts
respectively. Then the sum of C1 and C2, let call it C, is
represented by C = C1 + C2 + r × h where r is an integer
randomly chosen in [0,n − 1] and h = q2 × u as presented
in the previous section. This sum operation guarantees that
the decryption value of C is the sum m1 +m2. The addition
operation can be done several times, which means we can
do sums of encrypted sums.
The multiplication of two encrypted values and its decryp-
tion are done as follows: let e be the modified Weil pairing on
the curve and g, h the points of G as defined previously. Let
us recall that this modified Weil pairing e is obtained from
the Weil pairing E [7] by the formula: e(P,Q) = E(x×P,Q),
where x is a root of X3 − 1 on Fp2 . Then, the result of the
multiplication of two encrypted messages C1,C2 is given by
[Cm = e(C1,C2) + r × h1], where h1 = e(g, h) and r is a
random integer pick in [1,n].
The decryption of Cm is equal to the discrete logarithm
of q1 × Cm to the base q1 × g1:
m1m2 = logq1∗g1 (q1 × Cm.)
where g1 = e(g, g).
IV. OUR SECURE DATA AGGREGATION FOR SENSOR
NETWORKS
Data aggregation schemes aim to combine and summarize
data packets of several sensor nodes so that amount of
data transmission is reduced. An example data aggregation
scheme is presented in Figure 1 where sensor nodes collect
information from a region of interest. When the user (sink)
queries the network, instead of sending each sensor node’s
data to the base station, aggregators collect the information
from its neighboring nodes, aggregates them (e.g., computes
the average), and send the aggregated data to the base station
over a multihop path.
Collecting data & Encryption
Aggregation over cypher−text
Aggregation over cypher−text
Decryption & Aggregation
Normal Sensors
Aggregators
Aggregators
Sink (base station)
Figure 1. Secure data aggregation in sensor networks
As the majority of wireless sensor network applications
require a certain level of security, encryption of the sensed
data before its transmission becomes necessary and it is
preferable to decrypt the data only at the base station level
(c.f. previous sections). In our work, we adopt the following
scenario as shown in Figure 1: after collecting information,
each sensor node encrypts its data according to elliptic
curve encryption (c.f. Section III-A) and sends it to the
nearest aggregator. Then, aggregators aggregate the received
encrypted data (without decryption) and send it to the base
station, which in his turn decrypts the data and aggregates
it. We notice that all aggregators can done N additions and
the final layer of aggregators can done one multiplication
on encrypted data. For instance, to compute the average of
nodes measurements, aggregators can calculate the sum of
the encrypted measurements and the number of nodes took
these measurements and send it to the base station.
V. SECURITY STUDY
Due to hostile environments and unique characteristics of
sensor networks, it is a challenging task to protect sensitive
information transmitted by nodes to the end user. In addition,
this type of networks has security problems that traditional
networks do not face. In this section, we present a security
study dedicated to wireless sensor networks. First we intro-
duce the principal attacks that sensor networks can face and
how our approach can support them, then we present some
practical issues that improve the network security.
A. Related attacks and results
In a sensor network environment adversaries can com-
monly use the following attacks:
Known-plain text attack: They can use common
key encryption to see when two readings are
identical. By using nearby sensors under control,
attackers can conduct a known-plain text attack.
Chosen-plain text attack: Attackers can tamper
with sensors to force them to predeterminated
values.
Man-in-the-middle: They can inject false readings
or resend logged readings from legitimate sensor
motes to manipulate the data aggregation process.
In Table I and similar to [15], we present a comparison
between different encryption policies and possible attacks. In
our method, as data are encrypted by public keys, and these
public keys are sent by the sink to the sole authenticated
motes, the wireless sensor network is then not vulnerable
to a Man-in-the-middle attacks. On the other hand, our
approach guarantees that for two simalar texts gives two
different cryptograms, which prevents the Chosen-plain text
attacks and the Man-in-the-middle attacks. Finally, as the
proposed scheme possesses the homomorphic property, data
aggregation is done without decryption, and no private key
is used in the network.
B. Practical issues
In this section we present some practical issues to our
security model. First we study the sizes of the encryption
keys and we compare it to existing approaches. Then, we
present how we can optimize the sizes of cryptograms in
order to save more sensors energy.
1) Sizes of the keys: Cryptograms are points of the
elliptic curve E. They are constituted by couples of integer
coordinates lesser than or equal to p = lq1q2 − 1.
It is commonly accepted [16] that for being secure until
2020, a cryptosystem:
• must have p ≈ 2161, for EC systems over Fp,
Table I
ENCRYPTION POLICES, VULNERABILITIES AND AGGREGATION
Encryption Policy Possible attacks Data aggregation
Sensors transmit readings without encryption Man-in-the-middle Generating wrong aggregated results
Sensors transmit encrypted readings Known-plain text attack Data aggregation is impossible,
with permanent keys Chosen-plain text attack unless the aggregator has encryption keys
Man-in-the-middle
Sensors transmit encrypted readings None of above Data aggregation cannot be achieved
with dynamic keys unless the aggregator has encryption keys
Our scheme None of above Data aggregation can be achieved
• must satisfy p ≈ 21881 for classical asymmetric systems,
such as RSA or ElGamal on Fp.
Thus, for the same level of security, using elliptic curve
cryptography does not demand high keys sizes, contrary
to the case of RSA or ElGamal on Fp. The use of small
keys leads to small cryptograms and fast operations for
encryption.
C. Reducing the size of cryptograms
In this section we show how we can reduce the size of
cryptograms while using ECC. This is benefit for sensor
nodes in terms of reducing energy consumption by sending
data with smaller size. The messages are encrypted with q2
bits, which leads to cryptograms with a mean of 160 bits
long.
Let us suppose that p ≡ 3 ( mod 4). As the cryptogram is
an element (x, y) of E, which is defined by y2 = x3 + 1, we
can compress this cryptogram (x, y) to (x, y mod 2)) before
sending it to the aggregator (as the value of y2 is known).
In this situation, we obtain cryptograms with a mean of 81
bits long for messages between 20 and 40 bits long.
To decompress the cryptogram (x, i), the aggregator must
compute z = x3 + 1 mod p and y =
√
z mod p, which can
be written as y = z(p+1)/4mod p, then :
• if y ≡ i(mod 2), then the decompression of (x, i) is
(x, y).
• else the decompression is (x, p − y).
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
To show the effectiveness of our approach we conducted
a series of simulations comparing our method to another
existing one based on RSA cryptosystem. We considered a
network formed of 500 sensor nodes, each one is equipped
by a battery of 100 units capacity. We consider that the
energy consumption ′′E′′ of a node is proportional to the
computational time t, i.e., E = kt. The same coefficient
of proportionality k is taken while comparing the two
encryption scenarii. Sensor nodes are then connected to 50
aggregators chosen randomly. Each sensor node choose the
nearest aggregator. The running of each simulation is as
follows: each sensor node takes a random value, encrypts
it using one of the encryption methods then sends it to its
Security level Size p of the key E (battery units)
1 46 0.02
2 85 0.05%
3 125 0.07
4 167 0.10
Table II
OUR APPROACH
Security level Size of the key E (battery units)
1 472 0.08
2 945 0.53
3 1416 1.63
4 1891 3.63
Table III
RSA ENCRYPTION
aggregator. Aggregators compute the sum of the encrypted
received data and send it to the sink. We compared our
approach to the known RSA public-key cryptographic al-
gorithms, and we evaluated the energy consumption of the
network while varying the sizes of the keys and obviously
the security levels. The energy consumption is the units of
the battery used to do the encryption.
Tables II and III show the energy consumption of sensor
nodes to do the encryption operations using our encryption
method and the RSA one respectively. We varied the keys
sizes and obviously the security levels. We notice that for the
same level of security in our approach we used small keys
while saving more energy. For instance, for high security
levels (4 for example) a node using our approach needs to
use a key of 167 bits instead of 1891 in the case of RSA
and consumes 0.1 % of the battery power instead of 3.63
%.
Tables IV and V give the energy consumption E at the
aggregation stage. The same hypothesis that above have been
made, the sole difference is that aggregator nodes have a
battery of 1000 units of energy. It can be seen that the energy
needed by aggregators are between 50 and 500 times more
important in the RSA-based scheme, for the same level of
security.
Figure 2 gives the comparison between RSA and ellip-
tic curve based encryption, concerning the average energy
Security level Size p of the key E (battery units)
1 46 0.02
2 85 0.04
3 125 0.07
4 167 0.10
Table IV
OUR APPROACH
Security level Size of the key E (battery units)
1 472 1.13
2 945 8.09
3 1416 24.74
4 1891 56.27
Table V
RSA ENCRYPTION
consumption of an aggregating wireless sensor network. We
can notice that our approach saves the energy largely greater
than the case of RSA, where its depletion is so fast. Finally
let us notice that, in addition of reducing the amount of
energy units needed for encryption and aggregation, the sink
receives many more values per second in EC-based networks
than in RSA-based one.
Time
E
n
e
rg
y
Agregator's energy evolution
EC 46
EC 85
RSA 472
RSA 945
Figure 2. Comparison of energy consumption
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an elliptic curve based ap-
proach for secure data aggregation in sensor networks. It is
based on data encryption with homomorphic properties that
provide the possibility to operate on cypher-text. It prevents
the decryption phase at the aggregators layers and saves
nodes energy. Existing works have exponential bound in
computation and are not suitable for sensor networks, which
we tried to relax in our approach. The proposed scheme
permits the generation of shorter encryption asymmetric
keys, which is so important in the case of sensor networks.
The experimental results show that our method significantly
reduces computation and communication overhead com-
pared to other works, and can be practically implemented
in on-the-shelf sensor platforms.
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